



~APAN: GROWTH AND PROSPECTS
ER 1'--'"Michael Gorham*
Japanese food prices are among the highest in
the world. The actual cost of food in Japan is
even higher than retail prices alone would sug-
gest, since a significant amountoftax revenues is
devoted to agricultural subsidies. High food
costs primarilyreflect the existence ofa relatively
inefficient agricultural sector protected by a
comprehensive system of tariffs and import
quotas. While there are several reasons, includ-
ing strong political reasons, for the current state
ofJapanesefood andagricultural policy, a major
policy objective is Japan's desire for some rea-
sonable degree of food security.
We first discuss this current approach to food
security, ana men examine an alternative and
potentially cheaper strategy-the removal ofall
barriers to grain and soybean imports, along
with the creation of a one-year contingency
stockpile of each of those commodities. The
purpose here is not to criticize Japan for her
trade policies-~indeed,she has made a number
ofsteps toward the liberalization ofagricultural
trade over the past decade. Our purpose, rather,
is to discuss an alternative policy which could
generate lowerfood pricesandfood security, and
also open up the Japanese market to more
foreign agricultural products.
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ing a larger portion oftheir budgets tofood than
do the Japanese.
Eating in Japan is an expensive activity. A
recent (March 1979) survey of retail prices re-
vealed that shoppers in Tokyo were paying 504
percent more for potatoes, 112 percent morefor
broilers, 84 percent more for onions, 75 percent
more for apples, and 62 percent more even for
rice than were their counterparts in Washington,
D.C. In this survey of 21 food items in 16 major
capitals, Tokyo prices exceeded the medianin all
cases, and were the highest for just over half of
the items surveyed. I Since the demand for food
tends to be price inelastic, it is not surprisingthat
Japanese consumers spend a relatively large
share of their total budgets on food---39 percent
in 1975. This share is exceeded by only 3 of the
other 22 industrial countries shown in Chart 1.2
Two ofthese countries, Spainand Portugal, have
per capita incomes considerably below Japan's,
and given Engels' Law (thetraditionally negative
relationship between per capita income and the
share of income spent on food), one would
expecttofind the Spanish and Portuguesedevot-
Food Share ot Household
*Economist. Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco. Dennis
Barton provided research assistance for this article.
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consumption of grains5. Because such a large
share of the food supply must be imported,
Japanese food must cost more than that ofother
countries by the amant of the additional trans-
port and handling costs involved. However,
these transport costs are relatively minor-yet
Japanese farm prices range from 35 percent to
286 percent higher than the prices of foreign-
produced commodities shipped to Japanese
ports (Table 1).
Another possible explanation for high food
prices is Japan's highly labor-intensive distribu-
tion sector. Whether the Japanese system of
distribution is rational or not is a moot point.
There is no doubt, however, that Japan (for
whatever reason) has taken much less advantage
ofeconomies ofscale than have other countries.
For example, Japan has only half as many
people as the United States, but it has over twice
as many groceryoutlets. Add to this multitudeof
retail outlets a multi-layered and small-scale
wholesale sector, and the inevitable result is a
larger wedge between farm prices and final retail
prices than is the case in the United States.6 Yet
despite the price impact of this type ofdistribu-
tion sector, the problem actually begins back at
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Ofcountries at orabove Japan's income level,
only the Netherlands spends a larger share of
income on food. New Zealand, which has ap-
proximatelythesame percapitaincomeasJapan
(but which is also a land-rich and agriculturally
abundant country) spends less than half the
proportion of its income on food as does Japan.
Moreover, the Japanese seem to get less fortheir
money by most conventional measures. Japan
consumes significantly fewer calories per capita
than does any other OECD country (Chart 2),
and fewer grams of protein per capita than any
other OECD country save Sweden, where pro-
tein consumption is negligibly lower (Chart 3).3
Explaining High Food Costs
Why is food so expensive in Japan? There are
several relatively minor reasons. First, Japan
simply does not have the arable land to feed its
population, so a significant amount of its food
supply must be imported. Arable land in Japan is
estimated at .05 hectares per person. The United
States has 19 times as much, Canada 40 times as
much, and even crowded India has 6 times that
amount.4 During the 1972-74 period, just over
half of Japan's grain consumption (by weight)
was imported. By comparison, the European
Community imported 11 percent, China 2 per-
cent, India 3 percent, the Soviet Union5 percent,
andthe Philippines 12 percent,oftheirrespective
Chart 2
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32Source: Fred H. Sanderson, Japan's Food Prospects and
Policies. Washington, D.C.; The Brookings Institu-
tion 1978, pgs. 18-19.
Table 1
Ratio of Japanese to World Prices
Selected Products, 1976
Japanese price is the average price paid to farmers, or if
denoted *. it is the government purchase price.
World price is the average export unit price (plus 6-
percent estimated ocean-transportcost),or ifdenoted **, it is
the U.S. farm price.
Inefficiencies in Agriculture
Japan's high food prices are largely due to a
combination ofan inefficient agricultural struc-
ture and a protective system ofelaborate tariffs
and import quotas. Both domestic and foreign
observers have commented on this problem.
Patrick and Rosovskyofthe United Statescalled
agriculture "the largest and most conspicuous
sector ofeconomicinefficiency in Japan."7 Bieda
of Australia noted that "this problem of Japa-
nese agriculture being unable to evolve farms of
sufficient size to makethemeconomic is the most
intractable ofall Japaneseeconomic problems."8
Former Prime Minister Tanaka argued that
Japanese agriculture would have to undergo full-
scale reorganization and large-scale mechaniza-
tion.9
The average Japanese farm covers slightly less
than 3acres-roughly one-hundredth the size of
the average American farm-and is often scat-
tered in non-contiguous parcels. Thus, while the
Japanese rice farmer uses a combinationofsmall
machinery and his own labor for most rice
growing tasks, the American rice farmer seeds,
fertilizes and sprays for pests by airplane.
The Japanese farmer has performed extremely
well within this farm-size constraint: peracre rice
yields in Japan are among the highest in the
world and are several times the Asian average.
However, this tiny farm size presents a formid-
able barriertoachievingsignificanteconomiesof
scale. A major factor limiting farm size is the
Occupation-inspired land reforms, which severe-
ly restrict the amount of land which can be
owned orleased. Someefforts have been made to
liberalize these laws and allow larger-scale agri-
culture throughcooperatives, butas Bieda notes,
these reforms have failed to induce any percepti-
ble change in average farm size. iO While these
land-reform laws served theirpurpose in displac-
ing the rural aristocracy and providing employ-
ment and food to the repatriated and industrially
displaced Japanese following World War II, they
have now created serious fetters on efficiency in
agriculture. Before Japanese agriculture can
reorganize itself along more efficient lines, fur-
ther changes may be necessary in the legal frame-
work governing the ownership and the leasingof
land.
Even with reorganization, however, arable
land will remain scarce and valuable because of
the country's mountainous terrain. Land has
always been the scarce factor in Japanese agri-
culture, so that capital and labor have been
substituted for land to a much greater extent
than in the United States. Thus Japan in 1970
used more mechanical power (measured in
horsepower) per acre than any other country.I I
While Japanese agriculture has always been
more labor-intensive than Western agriculture,
rapidly rising industrialwages--generated by the
IO-percent annual economic growth rate of the
past two decades-have tended both to attract
farm labor to the cities and to raise the opportu-
nity cost ofthe labor remaining on family farms.
The Japanese have typically adapted to this
situation by sending the most able-bodied mem-
bers offarm families intothecities each day. As a
result, the farms are often left in the hands of
older, physically less productive and perhaps
entrepreneurially more conservative family
members. Farm family income benefits, of
course, since the urban worker often remains a
part of the farm household. Partly for this
reason,farmfamily income is significantly higher
than urban family income, and has risen more
rapidly than urban income since 1958, as shown
by Chart 4. (The relative improvement in farm
income is also attributable to the shift toward
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lower government selling price) amounted to
about $1.9 billion, and was the largest single item
in the budget of the Ministry ofAgriculture and
Forestry. While this government selling price is
lower than the farm price, it is still several times
the price at which foreign rice could be delivered
to Japan's door. Thus, in 1978, wholesalers paid
the Japanese government $6.4 billion more for
rice than they would have paid on the world
market. The total cost of rice protection in 1978
thus reached $8.3 billion, or about $72 for each
of the 115 million men, women and children in
the country. 13
There are, ofcourse, many other agricultural
items which involve tariffs and/or import quo-
tas. For 1972, Sandersoncalculated thatthecost
ofJapan'sfood supply, at the producerlevel, was
53 percent (or $5.5 billion) more than it would
have been in the absence ofimport restrictions. 14
At the retail level, this mighttranslateintoa price
premium of 20 to 25 percent above the alterna-
tive under free trade. IS
1960.)12 However, the flight of the prime-age,
male laborer from farm activity has also contri-
buted to the uncompetitiveness of Japanese
agriculture on the world market.
Protective Agricultural Shield
Japan's relatively uncompetitive agricultural
sector is able to survive because it is insulated
from the rest ofthe world by a system of tariffs
and import quotas. While a number of tariffs
have been reduced or removed over the past
decade, Japanese agriculture is still quite heavily
protected. Grains used for direct human con-
sumption (rice and wheat) generally are pro-
tected-while those used for animal feeding
(corn, sorghum, and oilseeds) generally are im-
ported free ofdutyorquota, to help provide low-
priceJeed for the livestock and poultry indus-
tries. While Japanese farmers do not grow any
corn, they do grow barley (which is the only
protected feed grain) and soybeans (for which
they receive a subsidy).
Not all of the cost of protection is passed
directly to consumers. Forexample, the govern-
ment sells rice to wholesalers for less than it pays
farmers. It offsets these losses partly by buying
foreign wheat and other grains at low world
prices and selling them domestically at higher
prices. To the extent that the rice subsidy is not
covered by "profits" on other government grain
transactions, it is paid from general revenues and
thus becomes a burden on taxpayers. To the
extent that these expenditures contribute to a
general budget deficit, financed by money crea-
tion, the burdentakestheform ofa higher rateof
inflation.
Ofall the types ofagricultural protection, the
rice subsidy is the most costly. In 1978, the rice
subsidy alone (i.e., the difference between the
government buying price and the 14-percent-
II. Causes of Protective Agricultural Policy
Why has Japanese agricultural policy been so
protective? Perhaps the best single answer is that
such a policy is in the interest of farmers, who
still have the political power to keep this pr6tec-
tive apparatus in place. The fact that farmers
account for only about 10 percent of the labor
force is politically deceptive. When the current
electoral districts were drawn in 1946-47, some
57 percent of the labor force was agricultural.
Those electoral boundaries remain intact, so that
the remaining rural population has retained its
early postwarpowerdespitethetremendousshift
34of population from the country to the city.16
Rural areas and small towns thus control about
60 percent of the Diet, and a rural vote can have
up to five times the weight of an urban vote.
Also, since rice occupies more than half the
cultivated acreage and accounts for more than a
third ofgross farm income, the relatively expen-
sive rice program tends to have strongsupportin
rural areas. So until there is some change either
in electoral boundaries or in farmer attitudes to-
ward protection, Japanese agriculture is likely to
remain insulated from the world market.
The agricultural-protection policy also is pop-
ular because it acts as a welfare program. One
could argue that the rapidly growing Japanese
industrial machine has attracted the most pro-
ductive workers offthefarms, leaving behind the
elderly and those less able tocope with an urban,
industrial environment. A free-trade policy
would seriously undercut the incomes of those
left behind in rural areas. But a protective policy
generates some urbansupport because, as Komi-
ya argues, urbanJapaneseviewsuch a policyas a
way ofsupporting the incomes ofthe elderlyand
poorl7-many of whom are their own relatives.
A third reason for agricultural protection--
one which has become increasingly important
since the 1973 food crisis--is Japan's desire to
reduce her extreme dependence on the outside
world for food. Japan is normally the world's
largest importer ofgrains, having passed Britain
in 1964. 18 Moreover, Japan is one ofthe world's
least self-sufficient countries in food supplies.
Ogura found that only I3 out of 103 countries
during the 1970-72 period depended upon for-
eign sources for more than 25 percent of their
food calories. Only 3 of the 13 countries were
industrialized, and one of these was Japan. Of
the 18 largest countries, Japan was the only one
which imported morethan halfofits grain-52.I
percent in 1972-74. (Indeed, most of these large
countries were more than 90 percent self-
sufficient in grain.) Moreover, Japan's self-
sufficiency in food has declined rather sharply
since 1960. Over the following decade, her self-
sufficiency ratio declined 20 percent when mea-
sured in value, 30 percent when measured in
original calories, and 52 percent when measured
by weight (of grains only).19
For a while, there was surprisingly little con-
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cern over this increasing dependency upon for-
eign food supplies. According to Donnelly,
neither the annual white papers on agriculture
nor the annual report to the Diet bythe Ministry
of Agriculture and Forestry paid noticeable
attention to food security. "As late as 1972,
government planners and private research or-
ganizations were calmly projecting a continuing
and rapid decline in the agricultural economy as
a consequence ofofficial programs of rationali-
zation and liberalization."20
Then came three events which renewed Ja-
pan's concern over its degree of food depen-
dence. First was the Soviet crop shortfall and
consequent heavy purchases on the world mar-
ket in 1972 and 1973. Grain became hard to find,
and so wheat prices more than tripled and corn
prices more than doubled during that brief
period. Second was the temporary but very
upsetting interruption in the flow of American
soybeans to Japan. Japan imports about 97
percent of its soybean requirements, almost
entirely from the U.S. But in 1973, in response to
rapidly rising beef prices and "panic" Japanese
buying ofsoybeans, the U.S. temporarilyembar-
goed soybeanexports in orderto assuredomestic
supplies offeed. Even though the embargo lasted
only a few monthsand barelyaffected theannual
total of soybean shipments, the point had been
made: Japan's food importscould be interrupted
with short notice, depending on the internal
politics ofa major food-exporting country. The
thirdevent was the 1973-74 oil shock; while it did
not involve food, the oil embargo and quadru-
pling ofoil prices contributed toa generalfeeling
of vulnerability on the part of the Japanese.
While none of these three events actually
caused significant food shortages in Japan, the
potential for such a scenario became clear. And
unlike the United States, Japan has several
generations of people who experienced real and
prolonged hunger during the severe food short-
ages following World War II.
The policy response to this increased feeling of
vulnerability was an attempt to increase domes-
tic food production and thus decrease import
dependence.21 In April 1975, the National Agri-
cultural Council recommended a series ofsteps
to reverse the trend in Japan's food self-
sufficiency ratio. These included: the develop-ment of 0.7 million hectares of new land, the
addition of 1.3 million hectares through double
cropping of paddy fields, increased price sup-
ports to encourage these two developments,
diversification ofsources ofagricultural imports,
and a national stockpiling policy. The following
month, the Ministry of Agricultureand Forestry
published demand and supply projections to
1985 based upon this policy shift. The Ministry
proposed to reverse the previous decline in the
food self-sufficiency ratio (measured in value
terms), with an increase in the ratiofrom 73 to 75
percent over the 1972-85 period as a result of
increased subsidies to farmers. Actually, that
improvement may be difficult to achieve be-
cause, as Sanderson argues, the Ministry
underestimated the growth in meat demand and
overestimated the ability ofJapanese farmers to
double forage production over this period.
m. Food Security Via Greater Production
Assume for a moment that Japan could
achieve 75-percent self-sufficiency (in value
terms) in food by 1985. Would this actually
guarantee Japan a secure supply of food? To
answer that question, we must first determine
what it is that the Japanese are insuring against.
The worst scenario would be one in which all
foreign sources of food were cut off. This could
occur because the rest of the world was either
unable or unwilling to export. It is not impossi-
ble that a combination of \veather and pests
could seriously cut world harvests for several
years running, causing the export market to
vanish. In sucha case, Japan'straditional suppli-
ers would be simply unable to supply her needs,
despite the best of intentions.
Ofcourse, even the 1973-74 world food crisis
did not approach this type ofsituation, but it did
cause many analysts to believe that a long period
ofabundant food supplies had finally given way
to a new era of worldwide food shortgages.22
Japan thus had to take seriously the possibility
that world agricultural production had under-
gone a fundamental change. Once the dust set-
tled, however, the 1973-74experience was gener-
ally attributed to transient (not permanent)
factors··-basically a Soviet crop shortfall com-
bined with relatively thin world grain stocks.
Indeed, grain supplies later returned to normal
levels and prices fell by as much as two-thirds
from their 1973 peaks. Moreover, some analysts
argue that the medium-term outlook for world
food supplies is favorable for those who have the
currency to purchase supplies on the world mar-
ket. 23
Yet even if the rest of the world is able to
supply food to Japan,canJapan depend upon its
continued willingness to do so? The prospects
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seem favorable in this regard. Thefear thatgrain
producers will form an OPEC-like cartel to
restrict production appears unfounded, since
grain production involves botha large numberof
countries and millions ofproducers within these
countries-hardly the environment necessary to
make a cartel work. Furthermore, the potential
for grain production exists in almost all coun-
tries.
Export embargoes have been used in the past
for political reasons. The United States stopped
trading with Cuba in 1959 because the new
Cuban government expropriated U.S. oil refin-
eries. Again, the United Nationsdeclared a trade
embargo on Rhodesia in 1966, following the
latter's declaration of indendence from Britain
and establishment of a white minority govern-
ment. (Both ofthese embargoes are still in effect
at this writing, though embargoes; like cartels,
are difficult to enforce.) However, since both
Cuba and Rhodesia are agricultural countries,
they have not incurred serious food shortages
because of the embargoes. In fact, the interna-
tional community generally withholds food sup-
plies only in cases ofoutright military hostilities.
So Japan, short of war, should probably not
worry about the willingness of the rest of the
world to supply grain as long as that grain is
readily available.
For that matter, even a high level ofdomestic
agricultural production might notassure a stable
supply of food in the case of outright military
hostilities. Japanese agriculture is energy de-
pendent, and an interruption of oil supplies
would hamper field work and slow the produc-
tion of fertilizers and pesticides. Sanderson cal-
culates that a sharp decline in fertilizer supplies
alone could reduce grain yields by one quarter(for wheat and barley) to one third (for rice).24
Furthermore, an interruption in energy supplies
would probably also reduce the Japanese fish
catch-a serious event since the Japanese eat
about twice as much fish as they do meat.
Sanderson estimates that such an emergency
could reduce Japan's food production to about
1,650 calories (grain equivalent) per person per
day--considerablyless than minimum biological
requirements.25 In short, Japan simplycould not
weather a total trade embargo, even if she in-
creased the self-sufficiency ratio to 75 percent.
We may conclude that I) the medium-term
outlook for world food production is relatively
good, 2) the rest ofthe world would be willingto
supply food to Japan as long as crop surpluses
are available, and 3) in the event ofwar, without
accessible food-producing allies, Japan would
not be able to produce enough food to feed its
population even at a 75-percent self-sufficiency
ratio.
Cost of Protection
What is the cost to Japan of this current
approach to food security? Answers differ
widely-partly because ofdifferences in statisti-
cal methodology-ranging from $0.4 billion to
$6.0 billionannually,orin percapitaterms, from
$4 to $54 annually.
Japanese agricultural policy imposes costs on
both consumers and taxpayers, and imparts
benefits to producers. Consumers pay more for
food, and consume less food, than they would
under a free-trade scenario. Taxpayers pay
higher taxes, which are then used to subsidize
farmers. While Japan's protective policy is pri-
marily designed to redistribute income from
consumersand taxpayerstofarmers, there is also
a net social loss involved. This loss has two
components. First, there is the deadweight loss in
production due to the transfer ofresources from
other, more productive, pursuits to the less
productiveactivitiesofthe protected agricultural
sector. Second, there is the deadweight loss in
consumption due to the impactofartifically high
food prices on consumers, with households pur-
chasingless food as well asmore non-food items
which give them less satisfaction per yen. (See
Appendix for a more formal discussion of the
costs of protection.)
Ofthe three studies listed in Table 2, only the
Bale and Greenshieldsstudyattemptsto measure
the net social loss due to Japan's agricultural
policy. The other two studies, although method-
ologically simpler, sacrifice a certain amount of
theoretical neatness. They simply calculate the
difference between domestic agricultural pro-
duction valued at official producer prices and
that same production valued at the world prices
which would prevail under free trade. While this
simple calculation captures the social dead-
weight loss in production, it also includes the
transfer of income from consumers and taxpay-
ers to farmers. Furthermore, it ignores the dead-
weight loss in consumption resulting from the
fact that at lower world market prices, consum-
ers would purchase more food, increasing their
overall satisfaction. Therefore, this hybrid cost
measure of Payne/Severs and Sanderson over-
states the social cost by the amount of the
consumer and taxpayer transfer to farmers, and
understates it by the amount of the deadweight
loss in consumption. While, in theory, this cost
measure could either fall short of or exceed the
methodologically current calculation of social
cost, the estimates generated by the three studies
suggest that the hybrid-cost measure is probably
an overstatement.
According to the Bale-Greenshieldsestimates,
the social cost of agricultural protection in the
Table 2



























• Social loss in production plus
transfer from consumers and
taxpayers to farmers
• Net social loss in production
and consumptionmid-1970's was not very burdensome. (Still,
a(:(:ording to Sanderson, a substantialamountof
income was transfered from consumers and
taxpayersto farmers-about $7.3 billion, or$65
per capita, for the rice programalone.) But when
BaJea.nd. Greenshields examine the increa.sed
level of protection currently planned for 1985,
they see a substantial rise in social cost. The
incremental annual cost of moving the self-
sufficiency ratio from 73 to 75 percent turns out
to be more than $3 billion for each percentage
point, or a rather negligible increase in food
security at a rather substantial cost. In 1985 this
cost would average $63 per capita (in 1975-76
dollars), ifthecurrent I.2-percentrateofpopula-
tion growth continues. The actual burden might
be better expressed ona perworkerbasis, since.it
is typically the income earner who paysthe taxes
and buys the gro(:eries..If roughly. half of the
Japanese population isemployect in 1985, then
the per-worker social cost ofagriculturalprotec-
tion would be about $125. If we.include the
income transfered from taxpayers and consum-
ers to farmers, the burden would in(:rease signifi-
cantly.
IV. A Stockpile Approach to Food security
A high level ofdomestic agricultural produc-
tion is not the only way to assure a secure supply
offood. An obvious alternative is to stockpile a
sufficient amount of food and feed grains to
insure against world-market shortages. This
approach has not received much serious discus-
sion, at least not in the English-language litera-
ture. Komiya notes that "a .systematic stock-
piling progr.am may cost much less than
agricultural protection to prepare for possible
emergencies," but he does not provideanycalcu-
lations to support this argument.29
An OECD report notes that the Japanese
government "has been envisaging increasing its
stocks ofwheat and barley and also encouraging
private stocks of feed grains and soybeans."30
However, at this writing, noneofthese commod-
ity stockpiles appear to exceed one or two
month's consumption.31 Sanderson, more ex-
plicitly, suggests providing up to one year's
stockpile of imported grains and soybeans. He
does notcalculatethecost ofsucha program, but
suggests that it might be quite high.32
In order to assess the costs and benefits of a
stockpile policy, let us assume that the Japanese
government decides I) to gradually remove all
barriers to agricultural imports, and 2) togradu-
ally develop a one-year rotating stockpile of
essential food and feed grains and soybeans.
Such an approach should reduce consumer food
costs, since (as will be shown) the cost of this
policy would be significantly less thantha.t ofthe
current approach of supporting domestic pro-
duction. This approach also could partially
insulate the domestic market from large swings
in world grain prices. This would involve storing
more when prices were low and less when prices
were high. Since a flexible approach ofthis type
would require a larger capacity per average ton
ofgrain stored, it would also entail certaincosts.
Table 3
Changes in World Production of Selected Crops (Percent)
Rice Wheal Corn Barley Soybeans All Five Crops
1970/71 3.1 1.2 1.9 2.0 3.2 1.I
71/72 1.5 10.8 14.5 14.1 4.3 9.0
72/73 -3.7 2.6 -2.0 1.5 9.2 ~0.3
73/74 7.3 12.2 9.9 14.1 23.3 11.0
74/75 1.8 4.1 -9.0 1.2 -7.3 ~3.3
75/76 6.8 -2.1 12.3 ~9.6 22.6 4.0
76/77 -1.0 18.5 4.2 23.0 -11.8 8.0
77/78 4.1 7.8 4.8 2.8 24.8 0.6
78/79 4.2 14.7 3.2 9.2
Source: Commodity Research Bureau. Inc., Commodity Yearbook 1978. and FA 0 Monthly BulletinofStatistics, February
1979.
38Would this policy really providefood security?
How much would it cost? What effect would
such a policy have on Japanesefarmers-and on
theinternationalgrain market? We considereach
of these questions in turn.
A one-year stockpile of soybeans and major
grains (i.e., wheat, rice, corn and barley) would
surely guard against anyone-year shortfall in all
crops or multi-year shortfalls of a single crop.
Over the past decade, the world market has not
once experienced a simultaneous downturn in
the production of all five crops, and only once
experienced two consecutive declines in any
single crop (see Table 3). Even this latter case--
the wheat decline of 1974-75-wascushioned by
more than offsetting increases both before and
after the shortfall.
While a one-year stockpile of grains and
soybeans would insure against temporary pro-
duction shortfalls, there are two possible scenar-
ios in which it would not do the job. The first
would be a prolonged war without accessible
food-producing allies. (Allies across an ocean
might not be of much use.) The second would be
a period ofprolonged crop shortages. We can say
nothing about the first scenario, except that
policymakers must assess the probability ofsuch
an occurrence and include this in their decision·
making. On the second point, this century has
seen its share ofstarvation, but this has typically
been associated with wars or localized crop fail-
ures accompanied by a lack of income to pur-
chase food on the world market. There has not
been any prolonged period ofinsufficient global
production. Whi.le we cannot simply extrapolate
the past, several post-1973-crisis studies suggest
that food supplies will be adequate over the
medium-term future. Thus, as long as Japan has
the income to purchase food on the world mar-
ket, the food is likely to be there.
The storage approach to food security cannot
bejudgedagainst some ideal standard,but rather
against the current approach of import quotas
and subsidized production. As explained above,
even the current approach would not fare very
well in the case ofa prolonged war withoutfood-
or energy-producing allies. Furthermore, any
worldwide pest, disease, or weather change
which reduced yields in the rest of the world,
could just as easily affect Japanese production.
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And if prolonged shortages arose, for whatever
reason, Japan could still allocate some resources
again to domesticgrain production. Skills would
be rusty, mistakes would be made, and yields
would. remain low, but the country could shift
back to some level ofgrain production in case of
emergency. Thus, while there is no final answer,
the storage approach probably could provide as
much security as the current approach.
Cost, then, should be the deciding factor. Let
us calculate the annual cost of a hypothetical
storage program initiated in 1976-77 (Table 4).
There are two major cost components in-
volved-the cost of purchasing and the cost of
storingthegrain. To convert the initial lump-sum
purchase cost of $5.8 billion to an annual cost,
we assume that the Japanese floated a perpetual
bond for that amount, and calculate the annual
interest payments as the annualized cost of
purchase. The government-bond rate in 1976-77
was two percentage points higher than the early-
1979 rate, but to be conservative we use that high
rate. (This is appropriate, since government
bond sales involve modest government coercion
and the stated rate may be a bit higher thana free
market would yield.) On this basis, the annual
cost of the initial purchase amounts to $465
million. Total storage costs, which are also esti-
mated on the high side, approximate the same
figure. So annual storage and amortized pur-
chase costs would come to about $0.9 billion, or
slightly less than $8 percapita, with rice account-
ing for about half of the total program cost.
One disadvantage of the rotating stockpile
approach would be a decline in the qualityofrice
purchased by the averge consumer. At present,
Japanese stores typically sell rice when it is less
than a year old, though they sometimes mix one-
to two-year old rice with the new rice following
years of poor harvests. Americans generally do
not notice taste differences in rice stored as long
as three or more years, but the Japanese are
much more sensitive to taste changes which
result from age, and have a definite preference
for new over old rice. The quality decline would
be slowed if the rice were stored in rough (un-
husked) form, but this tends to raise storage
costs, as our calculations indicate.
The $0.9-billion annual stockpile cost would
be roughly double the Balel Greenshields esti-mateofthe net social loss attributabletoagricul-
turalprotection in 1976-77. Consequently, ifthe
stockpile and protectionist approaches to food
security provided equivalent outputs, Japan
clearly made the correct least-cost choice for the
mid-1970's. But this would not necessarily be the
correct strategy for 1985. Bale and Greenshields
estimate that the extra two percentage points of
food self-sufficiency planned by the japanese
government will involve a social cost of $7.9
billion (in 1975-76 dollars). In contrast, the
stockpile by 1985 might cost just over $1 billion
(in 1976-77 dollars), as grain storage needs rise
with population growth and with an expected
increase in per capita meat and poultry con-
sumption. A storage approach could thus be
some $6-7 billion cheaper than the cost of
continuing the current policy.
International Effects
Ifa free-trade program(withstockpiling) were
adopted, what effect would it have on interna-
tional grain markets? Since Japan already im-
ports 89 percent of her barley, 96 percent ofher
wheat and soybeans, and virtually 100 percentof
her corn and sorghum, the impact on world
markets ofreduced domestic productionofthese
commodities would be almost imperceptible. If
Table 4























































Barley, wheat and soybeans from Bale and Greenshields op. cit. p. 60. Corn!sorghum estimated from data in Studyof
Trends in World Supply and DemandofMajor Agricultural Commodity, Paris: aCED, 1976, p. 163. Rice from USDA
"Foreign Agricultural Circular: Grains," March 1978, p. 52. The 14.6 million tons ofrice consumption is in rough form and
is equivalent to 10.6 million tons milled, since there is a 27.4-percent wastage in Japanese rice milling.
2 Prices are U.S. wholesale prices plus 6percent for transportation(and insurance) to Japan. Rice price is U.S. farm price plus
6 percent for domestic handling, plus another 6 percent for transportation to Japan. Prices are from Commodity Research
Bureau, Inc., Commodity Yearbook 1978, New York, 1978. For6-percent shipping factor, see Sanderson 1978, op. cit., p.
19. Cheaper sources of these grains may be available elsewhere; for example, Bangkok prices for milled rice tend to be 25
percent below U.S. prices. We also assume here that price elasticity ofdemand is 1.0, so that the stock purchase would bid
prices up by the following percentages: rice, 4.1 percent; wheat, 1.5 percent; corn, 3.5 percent; barley, 1.3 percent; soybeans,
4.7 percent.
3 Storage costs for rice from Shelby Holden and Earl Sternis, "Costs of Commercial Rice Drying and Storage Facilities in
Mississippi, 1978," Agriculturaland Forestry Experiment Station, Mississippi State University, 1979, Mimeo. Storagecosts
for other grains based upon USDA payment of $0.25 a bushel to cover farmer storage costs in various agricultural
programs. The rice-storage cost is estimated for 1978, atabout II percentabove theJanuary 1977 figure. Also, storagecosts
ofother grains range from 23 to 53 percent higher than those used in a Brookingsstudyofgrain reserves. See PhilipTrezise,
Rebuilding Grain Reserves: Toward an International System, Washington, D.C. 1976. This upward bias in our storage
estimate should much more than offset any higher land costs in Japan, given that land accounts for a very small portion of
creating a storage facility~0.3 percent in the case of the U.S. rice facility.
4 The interest rate used here is the average Japanese government-bond rate for 1976-77. This rate has since fallen to an
average 6.09 percent in 1978.
40Customers purchasing more than 10 percent olthatexpor-
ter's sales
Source: United Nations, Yearbook ollntemational Trade
Statistics. /977. Vol. 2, p. 518-519.
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Exporter of tons) (by value) Major Customers'
U.S. 2,107.0 31 Indonesia(l2%),lran(1l%)
Thailand 1,977.8 21 Indonesia (27%)




duction, but if that were done, a potential 2
million acres could be diverted-enough to pro-
duce 4 million metric tons ofshort-grain rice, or
just over one-fourth oftotal Japanese consump-
tion.36
A listing of the world's leading exporters
indicates the sources of potential Japanese sup-
ply (Table 5). Actual trade patterns, of course,
would depend on such factors as productionand
transportation costs, alternative land uses, polit-
ical develoments, and so on. At any rate, all
exporters except Italy and Egypt today send
significant shipments to Indonesia, one of Ja-
pan's neighbors. All five ofthose exporters (the
U.S., Thailand, Pakistan, Burma,and Australia)
thus could become major suppliers to Japan,
provided that they offered the desired short-
grain variety. Moreover,Japan'sexperiencewith
the 1973 world food crunch and U.S. soybean
embargo has increased her desire to diversify
sources of food imports. Consequently, ifJapan
should decide to cease or sharply reduce rice
production, she probably would spread her
import business among a number of producers,
some of which (such as Taiwan and Korea) do
not even appear in our listing.
the program had been implemented in 1976,
additional Japanese requirements for wheat,
soybeans and barley would have been no more
than 1.0-1.5 percent ofthe world exportmarkets
for those commodities.34The rice market would
be dramatically different, however-at least in
the extreme case where all Japanese producers
drop out of business because of the effects of a
free-trade policy. In that case, Japan would
probably not have been able to purchase suffi-
cient rice in 1976 to fulfill her domestic require-
ments; and an attempt to do so would have
driven prices sharply upward. After all, Japan's
12-million metric ton consumption was almost
twice the size of the world export market in that
year. On the other hand, only about 2 to 4
percent of world rice production enters the
export market in any given year, reflecting the
fact that rice (unlike wheat and corn) is generally
consumed where it is produced. Therefore, rice
production outside Japan would have had to
expand only about 3 percent in 1976-77 to offset
the cessation of Japanese rice production.
The problem may be complicated by the fact
that the Japanese have a strong preference for
short-grained rice-as opposed to the long-or
medium-grain rice which is produced in such
major growing areas as China, Thailand and the
Philippines. It is not difficult to shift production
from long-to short-grain rice, but major adjust-
ments would have to be made in production and
marketing patterns, commensurate with the vast
size ofJapan's expected demand. In any event, a
recent Trilateral Commission report argues that
with certain changes in irrigation, Asian rice
production could be doubled in 15 years,35 so
that a sharp rise in Japanese demand could be
handled by the world market.
What role would the United States,frequently
the world's leading rice exporter, play in this
picture? California,which is now the onlysignifi-
cant producer ofshort-grain rice in this country,
probably cannot bring additional land into rice
production due to water constraints. By shifting
its medium-grain land into short grain, it could
produce another 700,000 metric tons, but that
would be less than 5 percent ofJapan's needs. A
significant increase in short-grain prices would
be needed to bid land in Arkansas and other
southeastern states away from long-grain pro-
41Effect on Farm and Food Sectors
As noted earlier, agricultural protection in
Japan is viewed as part of the nation's welfare
program-an important consideration, since the
Japanese have no well-developed social-security
system. The removal of subsidies, tariffs and
quotas would thus have a tremendouslydepress-
ing effect on farm income. Farm land prices
would also be depressed, so farmers who had
been looking toward land appreciation as a
major form ofretirement protection would find
these capital losses eating into their planned
future consumption. On the other had, income
losses would be cushioned by the availability of
non-farm sources of income. Also, land price
declines-at least near urban areas-would be
cushioned by the potential utilization of farm
land for non-agricultural purposes.
Still, a change to a free-trade policy would
invQlve serious social dislocations. Many of the
farmers who would be forced out ofbusiness are
probably too old and unskilled to enter the non-
farm laborforce. About a third ofthe agricultur-
al labor force in 1972 consisted of people over
50, and few ofthese people would be able tofind
equally attractive occupationsoutside ofagricul-
ture. So if the policy change were ever made, it
would have to bedoneslowly and with appropri-
ate compensation to those made worse offby the
change.
The face of the Japanese agricultural land-
scape would change considerably with such a
move, in view of the fact that almost half of
Japan's farm land has been devoted to rice in
recent years. Ifforced to compete on the world
market,only the most efficient rice growers on
the best land would remain in business. With the
drastic cutbacks in rice and other grain produc-
tion, muchland would shift toforestry and non-
agriculturaLuses. Other land would shift into
agriculturalpursuitsforwhich theJapanesehave
or could develop a comparative advantage. In
Sanderson's view, these would include produc-
tionofIivestock,fruits, vegetables, and nutsY
IfJapan were to reduce her primary-produc-
tionrole,she might be wise to expand herrole as
an. important food processor. The processed
component of the world's food supply is grow-
ing, and will continue to grow as rising world
incomes and growing female labor-force partici-
pation cause households tosubstituteawayfrom
kitchen labor. Japan may have a comparative
advantage here, in view of the inroads she has
already made in the soy-sauce and instant-
noodle markets. Othernon-perishableprocessed
foods which can be convenientlyshipped include
breakfast cereals and stacked potatochips. Also,
a whole range ofnew soybean derivatives is not
out of the question. If Japan developed as an
important supplier of processed foods, other
countries would be more reluctant to reduce her
supply ofprimaryagriculturalcommodities. The
more Japan becomes a supplier as well as a
demander offood stuffs, the more secure will be
her own domestic food supply.38
Conclusion
This paper has called attentiontothe highcost
offood in Japan, and attributed this mostly to
the current agricultural policy, which subsidizes
and protects inefficient grain production. That
policy primarily reflects the rurally-biased distri-
bution of political power in the country, but it
also reflects urban consumers' fears about the
security ofJapan's food supply.
We consideredanalternativeapproachto food
security, specifically the maintenance of a one-
year stockpile ofall majorgrains. While the cost
ofstockpilingwould have exceeded the netsocial
cost ofthecurrent program in the mid-1970's, by
the mid-1980's this cost relationship would likely
be reversed. By 1985, current policies could cost
42
just under $8 billion, while the stockpile ap-
proach could run a little over $1 billion. Aswitch
to the stockpile approach could have a dramatic
impact. on the domestic farm economy, with
falling prices, production, land values and in-
comes. Thus if such a policy shift took place, it
w0uldhave to be implementedslowly. However,
Japan could evolve into a major food processor,
importing raw foods and exporting processed
foods for which there is a rapidly growing world
demand. By becoming a supplier as well as a
demander offoodstuffs, Japancould become an
important part of the world food-supply sys-
tem........one which could not be easily cut off in
times offood shortages.Appendix: Winners and losers in Japanese Agricultural Policy.
Figure 1
Welfare Effects of Japanese Agricultural Policy
Definitions: Pw=world price
Pc=consumer price
Pp=price paid to producer by government
01=quantity which would be supplied domesticany under free trade
Q2=quantilysupplied by domestic producers at subsidiZed price Pp
Q3=quantity demanded by consumers a1 government determined consumer price Pc
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Effects: Consumer Loss 2 + 4 + 6 + 7
Farm Subsidy 1+ 3
Tariff Revenue = 6
Taxpayer Loss 1+ 3 6
Producer Gain 1+ 2
Net Social Loss =3 + 4 + 7
Note: Consumers pay Pc-Pw more per unit of food and consume 04-03 less food than would be true
in free trade
We turnto theestimates ofthese losses givenin
Table 2. Only the Bale and Greenshields' study
estimates the two triangles representing the net
social loss ofprotection, 3+4+7. Theirestimate
ofthe 1975-76loss is relatively small,amounting
to less than $4 per capita. The other two studies
use a very simple technique which avoids the use
of supply and demand elasticities. They simply
calculate the difference between domestic agri-
cultural production valued at official producer
prices, and thatsame production valued atworld
prices. The simplicity of the calculation, how-
ever, sacrifices a certain amount of theoretical
neatness. This technique actually estimates the
deadweight loss in production plustheconsumer
and taxpayer transfer to producers, I +2+ 3+
4-a sort ofhybrid cost measure which overesti-
A diagrammatic illustration ofJapanese agri-
cultural policy is shown in Figure I. Under free
trade, the world price offood, Pw, would prevail
in the Japanese market, domestic producers
would supply QI of food (where their marginal
cost equaled the world price), consumers would
demand Q4, and the quantity Q4 - QI would be
imported. Japane~e agricultural policy involves
two deviations from this free-trade scenario.
First, a tariff of Pc - Pw is applied to imported
goods, so the domestic-market price is raised
from P w to Pc. (This is a simplification; since
there are also quotas and government purchases
of imports at world prices, with resale at higher
domestic prices.) Corresponding to this tariffis a
loss ofconsumersurplus represented by the areas
2 + 4 + 6 + 7.
Second, in order to stimulate domestic pro-
duction even more than is done by the tariff
alone, the government buys farm productsatthe
official producer price Pp and resells them in the
market at the lower price Pc, thus incurring the
loss I + 3. Note, however, that a portion of this
agricultural subsidy, I + 3, can be paid from the
tariff revenues 6. The actual cost to taxpayers is
thus I+3- 6. The total loss to consumers and
taxpayers is I + 2 + 3 + 4 + 7.
Not everyone loses in this retreat from free
trade. Producerincomes have risen by I+2+3+
4 + 5, though with increased production their
costs have also risen by3+ 4+ 5. The net gain to
producers is thus 1+2-the first area consisting
of a transfer from taxpayers and the second a
transfer from consumers.
We now come to the bottom line. Since I+2 is
simply shifted from consumers' and taxpayers'
pockets to producers' bank accounts, it cannot
be considered a loss to society as a whole, unless
we judge the gainers somehow less deserving
than the losers. There is, however, an unambig-
uous social loss in the two triangles 3 + 4 and 7.
Theformer, 3+4, represents thedeadweight loss
in production due to the transfer of resources
from more-productive to less-productive pur-
suits in the protected sector. The other triangle,
7, is the deadweight loss in consumption; this
represents the fact that consumers must now
shift to other products which give them less
satisfaction.
43mates the net social cost by theamount I+2- 7.
It. should thus not come as a surprise that this
technique yields considerably higher cost esti-
rnates •than· that of the Bale and Greenshields'
study.
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